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“REGISTRATION . . . MEANS A REGISTRATION”: 
A CRITIQUE OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S ADOPTION OF 
THE “APPLICATION APPROACH” TO COPYRIGHT 




A jewelry manufacturing company created and began selling a 
particular costume jewelry necklace.1  Over half a decade later, another 
company allegedly manufactured and sold copies of a virtually identical 
necklace.  The first company filed for a copyright registration in an 
effort to protect its intellectual property, aware that such a registration is 
required to sue for copyright infringement. 
But when is a copyright “registered?”  This seemingly simple 
question has a surprisingly ambiguous answer.  Registration of a 
copyright is required in order to bring an infringement action,2 and a 
court’s determination of when registration takes effect can have 
significant repercussions for copyright holders seeking to enforce their 
rights.  Federal circuit courts, however, are split regarding exactly when 
“registration . . . has been made.”3  Several circuit courts have found that 
registration occurs when the Copyright Office receives all of the 
applicable materials from the copyright holder.4  Other circuit courts 
have found that registration does not occur until the Register of 
Copyrights affirmatively approves the application and issues a certificate 
of registration.5 
 * Associate Member, 2010–2011 University of Cincinnati Law Review.  The author would like 
to thank his editors for their feedback and suggestions, his professors for their wisdom and guidance, 
and his family, especially his wife, for their love and support. 
 1. These alleged facts are adapted from the case primarily discussed in this Note.  See Cosmetic 
Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, IAC/InterActiveCorp, v. 
Cosmetic Ideas, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 686 (2010). 
 2. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (West 2010) (“[N]o civil action for infringement of the copyright in 
any United States work shall be instituted until . . . registration of the copyright claim has been made in 
accordance with this title.”). 
 3. Id. 
 4. See Chicago Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2003); Apple Barrel 
Prods., Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1984). 
 5. See La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2005), 
abrogated in part by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010); M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. 
Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486 (11th Cir. 1990), abrogated in part by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. 
1
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These divergent approaches may have a significant effect on the 
course of an infringement suit, especially in federal circuits that have not 
expressly considered the issue.  This ambiguity may result in unfairness 
to litigants; a court in one circuit may allow a copyright holder’s suit to 
proceed while a court in a different circuit may dismiss an infringement 
case on the exact same facts. 
The Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. 
IAC/Interactivecorp widened the circuit split.6  The Cosmetic Ideas 
court found that a copyright registration is effective—thereby enabling 
the copyright holder to institute an infringement suit—when the 
Copyright Office receives the appropriate materials, not when the 
Register acts upon them.7 
This Note argues that the Cosmetic Ideas court’s decision was in 
error.  Part II briefly discusses the history and substance of the 
Copyright Act of 1976; it also examines copyright registration decisions 
from federal circuit courts prior to Cosmetic Ideas.  Part III reviews the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Cosmetic Ideas.  Part IV examines the 
decision in light of the plain language of 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) and related 
sections, the statute’s legislative history, various sources of persuasive 
authority, and policy goals behind the Copyright Act.  Part V concludes 
that the Ninth Circuit adopted the wrong approach to copyright 
registration.  The section also urges the Supreme Court or Congress to 
clarify the meaning of “registration” under § 411(a) in order to unify 
United States copyright law and to resolve when a copyright holder may 
bring an infringement action. 
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND CASE LAW 
The Copyright Act of 1976 is the basis for copyright law in the 
United States,8 and § 411(a) requires that registration be made in order 
for an infringement action to be instituted.9  District and circuit courts 
have varied in their interpretations of this statute.  Subpart A discusses 
the Copyright Act of 1976; subpart B discusses the circuit courts that 
found, prior to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Cosmetic Ideas,10 that 
copyright registration is complete upon the Copyright Office’s receipt of 
the applicable materials (the “Application Approach”); and subpart C 
Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010). 
 6. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d 612. 
 7. Id. at 619. 
 8. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 et seq. (West 2010). 
 9. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a). 
 10. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d 612. 
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discusses the circuit courts that have found that registration is complete 
only upon affirmative action by the Register of Copyrights (the 
“Registration Approach”).11 
A. The Copyright Act of 1976 
The U.S. Constitution provides the foundation for copyright law in 
America.  Article I, § 8 grants Congress the enumerated power “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”12  The Copyright Act of 1976 (the Act or the 
1976 Act)13 unified the confusing mix of federal and state laws 
regarding published and unpublished works.14  In passing the Act, 
Congress broadened copyright protections and eliminated some statutory 
formalities by recognizing that a copyright exists the moment an idea 
finds original expression in some tangible medium.15 
Registration of a copyright is now voluntary and does not impact the 
protections that copyrights offer.16  In order to register a copyright, a 
copyright holder must submit three items to the Copyright Office: (1) an 
application;17 (2) a deposit (such as a photocopy) of the work;18 and (3) 
the appropriate fee.19 
So that a robust federal register could be established, Congress 
created several incentives to encourage voluntary registration.20  For 
 11. See La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1202 (10th Cir. 
2005), abrogated in part by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010).  The Tenth Circuit 
seems to have coined the phrases “Registration Approach” and “Application Approach” in the La 
Resolana Architects opinion; this Note will use these terms to refer to these approaches throughout. 
 12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  This clause is also the bedrock for America’s patent laws. 
 13. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 et seq. (West 2010). 
 14. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659; see also Cosmetic 
Ideas, 606 F.3d at 618–19 (discussion of copyrights before and after the 1976 Act). 
 15. See La Resolana Architects, 416 F.3d at 1199; 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (“Copyright 
protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible 
medium of expression . . . .”). 
 16. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2006) (“Such registration is not a condition of copyright protection.”); 
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (“[R]egistration of a claim to copyright in any work, whether published or 
unpublished, can be made voluntarily . . . .”). 
 17. 17 U.S.C.A. § 409 (West 2010). 
 18. 17 U.S.C. § 408(b) (2006). 
 19. 17 U.S.C.A. § 708 (West 2010). 
 20. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F.3d 612, 619 (9th Cir. 2010) (Congress 
“chose to encourage copyright holders to register . . . through various statutory incentives.”), cert. 
denied, IAC/InterActiveCorp, v. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 686 (2010); La Resolana Architects, 
416 F.3d at 1204–05 (“[T]hese rights and remedies are the ‘carrot’ to induce registration and the ‘stick’ 
is the lack of federal court jurisdiction until registration is accomplished.”), abrogated in part by Reed 
Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010) (noting that registration is a precondition to suit but 
3
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example, copyright registration enables a copyright owner to recover 
statutory damages and attorney’s fees from an infringing party.21  A 
certificate of registration can act as prima facie evidence of the 
copyright’s validity.22  Finally, and perhaps most importantly (and 
certainly most importantly as far as this Note is concerned), a work must 
be registered before a copyright owner can file an infringement action.23 
Section 411 of the 1976 Act embodies this last incentive and reads in 
part: 
 Except for an action brought for a violation of the rights of the author 
under section 106A(a), and subject to the provisions of subsection (b), no 
civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work 
shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright 
claim has been made in accordance with this title.  In any case, however, 
where the deposit, application, and fee required for registration have been 
delivered to the Copyright Office in proper form and registration has been 
refused, the applicant is entitled to institute a civil action for infringement 
if notice thereof, with a copy of the complaint, is served on the Register 
of Copyrights.  The Register may, at his or her option, become a party to 
the action with respect to the issue of registrability of the copyright claim 
by entering an appearance within sixty days after such service, but the 
Register’s failure to become a party shall not deprive the court of 
jurisdiction to determine that issue.24 
In the years subsequent to the passing of the 1976 Act, Congress 
amended it to ensure the United States’ compliance with the Berne 
Convention, an international copyright treaty that in part forbids the 
application of formalities to foreign copyright holders.25  In order to join 
the Berne Convention, Congress established a two-tier system in which 
owners of U.S. copyrighted works are required to register as a 
precondition to an infringement suit, but owners of foreign copyrighted 
works are not.26 
Section 101 of the Act vaguely says that “‘[r]egistration’ . . . means a 
registration of the claim in the original or the renewed and extended 
term of copyright.”27  This definition is unclear regarding when 
registration is complete so that a civil action may commence.  Some 
does not affect subject matter jurisdiction). 
 21. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 504, 505 (West 2010). 
 22. 17 U.S.C. § 410 (2006). 
 23. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (West 2010). 
 24. Id. (emphasis added). 
 25. Berne Convention art. 5(1, 2), Oct. 1, 1988, 102 Stat. 2853, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27. 
 26. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (“[N]o civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United 
States work shall be instituted until . . . registration . . . has been made[.]” (emphasis added)). 
 27. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2010). 
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courts have found registration to be complete when a copyright owner’s 
application, deposit, and fee are received by the Copyright Office;28 this 
has been called the Application Approach.  Other courts have found that 
registration requires an affirmative act, such as the Register’s approval, 
the issuance of a certificate, or the receipt of a certificate;29 this has been 
called the Registration Approach.  These approaches are discussed more 
fully in the following subparts. 
B. The Application Approach 
Prior to the Cosmetic Ideas decision, two circuit courts and several 
district courts subscribed to the Application Approach30—the idea that 
copyright “registration” is complete when the Copyright Office receives 
the copyright owner’s application, fees, and deposit.31 
The Fifth Circuit employed the Application Approach in Apple Barrel 
Productions, Inc. v. Beard, in which the parents of children who 
performed in a country music program split from the program’s creator 
to form their own similar show.32  The creator sued for copyright 
infringement, and the District Court for the Northern District of Texas 
denied the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction.33  In finding 
that the plaintiff had standing for a copyright infringement action despite 
having not received certificate of copyright registration at the time of the 
injunction hearing, the Fifth Circuit wrote, “One need only prove 
payment of the required fee, deposit of the work in question, and receipt 
by the Copyright Office of a registration application.”34  The court gave 
no underlying reasons for its conclusory statement. 
The Seventh Circuit has also adopted the Application Approach.35  In 
 28. See, e.g., Apple Barrel Prods., Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 386–87 (5th Cir. 1984). 
 29. See, e.g., La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 
2005), abrogated in part by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010). 
 30. See, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2003); Beard, 730 
F.2d at 386–87; Prunté v. Universal Music Group, 484 F. Supp. 2d 32 (D.D.C. 2007); Iconbazaar, 
L.L.C. v. America Online, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 630 (M.D.N.C. 2004); Havens v. Time Warner, Inc., 
896 F. Supp. 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 31. See also Mose Bracey, Searching for Substance in the Midst of Formality: Copyright 
Registration as a Condition Precedent to the Exercise of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction by Federal Courts 
Over Copyright Infringement Claims, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 111 (2006) (reviewing the circuit split and 
recommending the Application Approach); Sara Goldfarb, Comment, Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc. 
– Needlessly Endorsing Overly Strict U.S. Registration Requirements in Copyright Infringement 
Litigation, 20 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 419 (2006) (supporting the Application Approach). 
 32. Beard, 730 F.2d 384. 
 33. Id. at 386. 
 34. Id. at 386–87 (citing 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 7.16[B][1] (1978)). 
 35. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 354 F.3d 624. 
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Chicago Board of Education v. Substance, Inc., a public school teacher, 
who also edited a local Chicago newspaper aimed at teachers, published 
the entire contents of several standardized tests in order to show that the 
school district was administering bad tests.36  The school district sued 
the teacher and the publication for infringement, and the magistrate 
judge issued an injunction that prohibited the publication of any more 
tests.37  Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, found that the 
publication was not “fair use” but also that the injunction was 
overbroad.38  In doing so, he dismissed as “frivolous” the defendant–
infringer’s argument that the school district did not have a valid 
copyright registration.39  In finding the registration valid, he noted that 
“an application for registration must be filed [with the Copyright Office] 
before the copyright can be sued upon.”40  Two sentences later, 
however, Judge Posner hedged and said that “[h]ad the [copyright] claim 
been false, the registration should not have issued and maybe therefore 
the copyright could not have been sued upon,”41 indicating that 
registration may require an affirmative act by the Copyright Office, such 
as the issuance of a certificate. 
C. The Registration Approach 
At least two circuit courts and several district courts subscribe to the 
Registration Approach42—the idea that copyright “registration” is 
complete only when the Copyright Office has affirmatively approved the 
applicant’s copyright. 
The Tenth Circuit adopted the Registration Approach in La Resolana 
Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire,43 a case in which an 
architecture firm discovered that a realty company was selling 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 625–26. 
 38. Id. at 631–32. 
 39. Id. at 631. 
 40. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C.A. 411(a) (West 2010); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 34, 
§ 7.16[B][1][a][i]). 
 41. Id. 
 42. See, e.g., La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 
2005), abrogated in part by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010); M.G.B. Homes, 
Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486 (11th Cir. 1990), abrogated in part by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. 
Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010); Mays & Assocs., Inc. v. Euler, 370 F. Supp. 2d 362 (D. Md. 2005); 
Strategy Source, Inc. v. Lee, 233 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002); Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 680 F. Supp. 
658 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
 43. La Resolana Architects, 416 F.3d 1195.  By extensively discussing both the Registration and 
Application Approaches before adopting the Registration Approach, the opinion provides a nice yin to 
Cosmetic Ideas’s yang, which adopts the Application Approach after an equally extensive discussion. 
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townhouses that “looked strikingly similar” to those in architectural 
drawings previously produced by the firm.44  The firm applied for 
copyright registration and sued for copyright infringement.45  The 
District Court of the District of New Mexico dismissed the action, 
however, because the firm had not yet received its registration 
certificate.46  After reviewing general copyright law, the plain language 
of the relevant statutes, the various interpretations of the statutes, and 
subsequent acts of Congress, the Tenth Circuit adopted the Registration 
Approach and affirmed the dismissal.47  The court held that registration 
of a copyright under § 411(a) occurs only when the Copyright Office 
approves the application.48 
The Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue in M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. 
Ameron Homes, Inc. when the plaintiff, a home builder, alleged that the 
defendant, a competitor, copied a home’s floor plan from one of the 
plaintiff’s advertising brochures.49  Although the plaintiff had filed an 
application for copyright registration, the district court dismissed the 
initial case due to the plaintiff’s “failure to satisfy the condition 
precedent of having registered its copyright before initiating the 
infringement action.”50  Once the Copyright Office issued the certificate, 
the District Court for the Southern District of Florida allowed the 
plaintiff to amend its complaint and proceed.51  The Eleventh Circuit 
approved the district court’s actions, noting that the registration 
requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an infringement suit,52 and 
 44. La Resolana Architects, 416 F.3d at 1197. 
 45. Id. at 1197. 
 46. Id. at 1197–98. 
 47. Id. at 1198–207; see also 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 408–412 (West 2010). 
 48. La Resolana Architects, 416 F.3d at 1203.  Furthermore, the court found that “registration” 
required only the Register’s approval and not necessarily the issuance or possession of a certificate, 
although a certificate had evidentiary value in an infringement case.  Id. at 1207–08.  In La Resolana, 
the Copyright Office had actually approved the registration but had not yet issued a certificate when the 
suit was filed.  The district court deemed a letter from the Copyright Office saying the same 
inadmissible as hearsay, and because the plaintiff did not appeal the ruling, the circuit court was forced 
to affirm the dismissal because it had no evidence before it that showed that the work was registered.  Id. 
at 1208. 
 49. M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486 (11th Cir. 1990), abrogated in 
part by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010). 
 50. Id. at 1488–89. 
 51. Id. at 1489.  The circuit court noted the unusual procedural posture of this case: after the 
district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it was technically without 
jurisdiction to entertain the motion to amend, and the plaintiff should have filed a new lawsuit.  The 
circuit court, however, noted that “‘[i]t is too late in the day and entirely contrary to the spirit of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for decisions on the merits to be avoided on the basis of such mere 
technicalities.’”  Id. (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962)). 
 52. Id. at 1488.  The Muchnick court recently held that the registration requirement is 
nonjurisdictional and is instead merely a precondition to an infringement suit.  Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. 
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generally equating “registration” with the issuance of a certificate.53 
III. THE CASE: COSMETIC IDEAS, INC. V. IAC/INTERACTIVECORP 
On May 25, 2010, the Ninth Circuit decided Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. 
IAC/Interactivecorp and joined the Fifth and Seventh Circuits in 
adopting the Application Approach to copyright registration, creating a 
3–2 split among federal circuits.54  Below, subpart A presents the facts 
of the case, subpart B reviews the court’s examination of the statute’s 
language and context, and subpart C summarizes the court’s decision 
and reasoning. 
A. Brief Facts of Cosmetic Ideas 
In Cosmetic Ideas, plaintiff Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. (Cosmetic) accused 
the defendants IAC/Interactivecorp, Home Shopping Network, Inc., 
HSN LP, and HSN General Partner LLC (collectively HSN) of 
copyright infringement.55  Cosmetic created a costume jewelry necklace 
in 1997 and began selling copies in 1999.56  Cosmetic alleged that HSN 
began manufacturing and selling “virtually identical” necklaces 
sometime between 2005 and 2008.57  Cosmetic submitted a copyright 
application to the Copyright Office on March 6, 2008, and shortly 
thereafter received confirmation that the application had been 
received.58  Cosmetic then filed a complaint against HSN on March 27, 
2008, alleging copyright infringement of the neckla 59
At the time of Cosmetic’s filing, the Copyright Office had not yet 
Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1247 (2010).  Thus, when the M.G.B. Homes court called the requirement a 
“condition precedent,” 903 F.2d at 1489, they were spot-on; when they called it a “jurisdictional 
prerequisite,” id. at 1488, they were not.  The Muchnick court would likely consider the M.G.B. Homes 
court’s analysis a “drive-by jurisdictional rulin[g].”  Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. at 1244 (citations omitted). 
 53. M.G.B. Homes, 903 F.2d at 1488–89 (citing Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 680 F. Supp. 658, 
661 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“Receipt of an actual certificate of registration or denial of same is a jurisdictional 
requirement . . . .”); Int’l Trade Mgmt., Inc. v. United States, 553 F. Supp. 402, 403 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (“A 
suit for copyright infringement is conditioned on obtaining (or being denied) a certificate of 
registration.”)) (citations omitted). 
 54. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
IAC/InterActiveCorp, v. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 686 (2010).  As mentioned above, the Fifth, 
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits endorse the Application Approach, while the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits 
endorse the Registration Approach. 
 55. Id. at 613–14. 
 56. Id. at 614. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
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issued a certificate of copyright.60  HSN argued that Cosmetic did not 
have a valid copyright registration, and the district court granted HSN’s 
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.61  The Ninth 
Circuit reversed after conducting a de novo review of the district court’s 
statutory interpretation of the Copyright Act and finding that mere 
application to the Copyright Office for registration met § 411(a)’s 
precondition for an infringement suit.62 
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Jurisdictional, Textual, and Contextual 
Examination 
In determining that the Application Approach was the correct 
interpretation of § 411(a), the Ninth Circuit first dispensed with any 
jurisdictional questions.  It then looked to the plain language of the 
statute and, finding the language ambiguous, finally turned to the 
overarching policy goals of the Copyright Act of 1976 and its 
subsequent revisions.  The court’s analysis of (1) its jurisdiction, (2) the 
statute’s language, and (3) the statute’s context are discussed below. 
1. Jurisdictional Analysis 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals first addressed a jurisdictional 
concern.  The district court dismissed the action for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction, but between when the case was argued on appeal and 
when it was decided, the United States Supreme Court held that 
§ 411(a)’s registration requirement was merely a precondition to filing a 
claim and not a restriction on a court’s subject matter jurisdiction.63  
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit found that it had jurisdiction over the 
case.64 
 60. Id.  The Copyright Office did subsequently issue a certificate of copyright, and Cosmetic 
filed a new infringement action against HSN, which the district court stayed pending the outcome of the 
appeal of this case. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 614–15 (citing Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010)).  Muchnick 
abrogated in part a number of the precedential cases cited by the Ninth Circuit to the extent that those 
cases found that § 411(a) restricted a court’s subject matter jurisdiction; however, Muchnick did not 
affect determinations of when “registration” occurred (i.e., whether the courts followed an Application 
Approach or a Registration Approach).  Id. at 614–615.  Additionally, the Ninth Circuit recognized that 
the issue before the court was potentially moot as Cosmetic Ideas held a registration certificate at the 
time of appeal.  Id. at 616.  However, because it was an unsettled point of law that was “‘capable of 
repetition yet evading review,’” the court addressed the issue of when copyright registration was 
complete.  Id. at 616 (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n.11 (1975) (citation omitted)). 
 64. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 615. 
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2. Plain Language of the Statute 
When interpreting a statutory provision, a court begins with the 
statute’s plain language.65  The Cosmetic Ideas court began by analyzing 
the language of the relevant sentence of § 411(a): “‘[N]o civil action for 
infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be 
instituted until pre-registration or registration of the copyright claim has 
been made in accordance with this title.’”66  The court found that 
“registration” was “unhelpfully defined” in § 101 of the Copyright Act 
as “a registration of a claim in the original or the renewed and extended 
term of copyright.”67 
Finding “no guidance” in the statutory definition,68 the court turned to 
the language of the statute as a whole to determine its intended meaning 
and found further ambiguity.69  In effect, it found two parts that 
supported the Registration Approach, one part that supported the 
Application Approach, and one part that could support either.70 
In support of the Registration Approach, the court found language 
that seemed to require affirmative action by the Register of Copyright, 
indicating that application alone was not enough to effect “registration.”  
For example, § 410(a) directs the Register, upon examination and 
approval, to “register the claim and issue the applicant a certificate,”71 
showing that Congress meant registration to be incomplete until the 
Register granted approval.72  Section 411(a) gives an applicant the right 
to institute a civil infringement action when “the deposit, application, 
and fee required for registration have been delivered to the Copyright 
Office in proper form and registration has been refused,”73 indicating 
that the registration process is separate from the application process.74 
The Ninth Circuit, however, found that other sections of the Act 
 65. Id. (citing K & N Eng’g, Inc., v. Bulat, 510 F.3d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
 66. Id. at 616 (quoting 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (West 2010)).  The court noted that 
“preregistration” was only applicable to certain commercial works that have a history of infringement 
prior to commercial release; the necklace at issue in this case was not one of those works.  Id. at 616 n.6. 
 67. Id. at 616 (citing 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2010)). 
 68. Id. at 616–17. 
 69. Id. (citing United States v. Cruz-Gramajo, 570 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
 70. Id. at 617–18 (finding that § 410(a) and portions of § 411(a) support the Registration 
Approach, that § 408(a) may support the Application Approach, and that § 410(d) could be read to 
support either one). 
 71. 17 U.S.C. § 410(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 72. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 617 (“This provision places an active burden of examination and 
registration upon the Register, suggesting that registration is not accomplished by application alone.”). 
 73. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (West 2010) (emphasis added). 
 74. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 617 (“[T]his subsection could be read to mean that Congress 
intended registration to require acceptance or refusal by the Register, not mere delivery.”). 
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supported the Application Approach.  For example, § 408(a) states that a 
copyright owner “may obtain registration . . . by delivering to the 
Copyright Office” the required deposit, application, and fee,75 indicating 
that mere delivery of the appropriate materials secures registration.76 
Finally, the court found that one section of that statute could support 
either approach.  Section 410(d) provides that “[t]he effective date of a 
copyright registration is the day on which an application, deposit, and 
fee, which are later determined by the Register of Copyrights . . . to be 
acceptable for registration, have all been received in the Copyright 
Office.”77  This passage supports the Registration Approach in that the 
Register of Copyrights must examine the materials and deem them 
acceptable before the copyright’s registration date takes effect.78  On the 
other hand, it may also support the Application Approach because a 
valid copyright’s registration takes effect on the date the materials are 
received by the Copyright Office, assuming that approval is granted 
later.79 
3. Context of the Statute 
Because the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the plain 
language of § 411(a) and the surrounding sections did little to resolve 
whether “registration” of a copyright was complete upon application of 
materials or approval of such application, the court then looked to the 
context, history, and purpose of the statute.80 
It first noted that the 1976 Act differed from the 1909 Act in that it 
broadened its protections, increased incentives to create expressive 
works, and relaxed the 1909 Act’s formalities.81  The court also noted 
that Congress amended the 1976 Act to comply with the Berne 
Convention, relaxing the formalities even further.82  Finally, the court 
 75. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 76. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 617 (“This section implies that the sole requirement for 
obtaining registration is delivery of the appropriate documents and fee.”). 
 77. 17 U.S.C. § 410(d) (emphasis added). 
 78. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 618 (“[T]he statute could be read to require action by the 
Register to effect registration.”). 
 79. Id. (noting that this section “supports the interpretation that application is the critical event”). 
 80. Id. (“We are not persuaded that the plain language of the Act unequivocally supports either 
the registration or application approach.”). 
 81. Id. at 618–19 (internal citations omitted).  For example, the 1976 Act established copyright 
upon creation of the work rather than the 1909 Act’s requirement of publication, notice, registration, and 
deposit of the work.  The 1976 Act created a unitary federal system for works both published and 
unpublished where the 1909 Act left the protection of unpublished works to the states.  Furthermore, the 
1976 Act relaxed notice requirements and eliminated mandatory registration. 
 82. Id. at 619, nn.9 & 12.  The U.S. adopted amended copyright laws in 1988 in order to become 
11
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discussed Congress’s interest in maintaining a robust federal register and 
incentivizing registration,83 and it noted that “copyright holders 
frequently register specifically for the purpose of being able to bring 
suit.”84 
C. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision and Reasoning 
After reviewing the statute’s plain language and context, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that a copyright owner could bring an infringement 
action upon mere application for copyright registration.  The court was 
persuaded that the Application Approach “better fulfill[ed] Congress’s 
purpose of providing broad copyright protection while maintaining a 
robust federal register” for the following reasons.85 
First, the court found that the Application Approach avoided 
unnecessary delays in litigation.  Because § 411(a) allows a copyright 
owner to bring suit whether the Copyright Office accepts or rejects the 
registration,86 the court found no reason to force a litigant to wait for a 
decision that ultimately had little effect.87  It found support in Nimmer 
on Copyright, a leading copyright treatise: “‘[G]iven that the 
claimant . . . will ultimately be allowed to proceed regardless of how the 
Copyright Office treats the application, it makes little sense to create a 
period of “legal limbo” in which suit is barred.’”88 
The Ninth Circuit also found that the Application Approach kept 
intact the various goals of the 1976 Act.  For one, it maintained the 
incentive to register one’s creative work, leading to a more robust 
federal register.89  Abolishing the need to wait for the issuance of a 
certificate also eliminated “the type of needless formality Congress 
party to the agreement.  See Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 7, 102 Stat. 2853.  For example, § 410(a) makes 
notice entirely permissive, and foreign works are not subject to § 411(a)’s pre-suit registration 
requirement.  See also Berne Convention, art. 5(2), Oct. 1, 1988, 102 Stat. 2853, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-
27. 
 83. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 619 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659).  Registration is optional, but incentives associated with registration include 
allowing a registration certificate to be prima facie evidence of a valid copyright (§ 410(c)), making 
certain remedies such as statutory damages and attorney’s fees available only after registration (§ 412), 
and requiring registration of U.S. works as a prerequisite to bringing any infringement action (§ 411(a)). 
 84. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 619. 
 85. Id. 
 86. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (West 2010) (noting that if a copyright registration is rejected, an 
infringement action may still proceed as long as the Register is provided with notice of the suit). 
 87. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 619–20. 
 88. Id. at 620 (quoting NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 34, § 7.16[B][1][a][i]). 
 89. Id.  The court, however, also noted that the Registration Approach preserved this goal 
equally well.  Id. at 620.  This Note argues below that the Registration Approach incentivizes 
registration even more effectively than the Application Approach. 
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generally worked to eliminate in the 1976 Act.”90 
According to the court, the Application Approach helps to make the 
judicial system more efficient.91  The possession of a certificate has no 
substantive impact on a copyright holder’s overall right to bring a suit,92 
and forcing litigants to wait for a registration certificate under the 
Registration Approach could result in the dismissal of suits that would 
likely be refiled in a matter of weeks or months.93 
Furthermore, the Application Approach protects a copyright owner 
from being disadvantaged by any delay inherent in the Copyright 
Office’s processing of the application.94  The statute of limitations for a 
copyright infringement suit is three years.95  If registration did not occur 
until the Register issued a certificate, then copyright owners who filed 
for registration late in the three-year period would be penalized for any 
delay by the Copyright Office, potentially losing their entire right to 
sue.96  If, on the other hand, registration is complete upon the Register’s 
mere receipt of the appropriate materials, copyright holders run little risk 
of the statute of limitations expiring other than due to their own delay.97 
Finally, the court noted that the Register’s decision did not require 
deference.  If the Register rejects the registration of a copyright already 
in litigation, the Register still has an opportunity to appear regarding 
registrability, especially given the (slow) pace of litigation.98  The court 
found the Register’s decision of whether to grant a registration 
certificate “largely perfunctory, and . . . ultimately reviewable by the 
courts,” lending no compelling reason for the delay of infringement 
litigation.99 
The Ninth Circuit ultimately adopted the Application Approach over 
the Registration Approach and held that the registration requirement of 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id.; see also Brush Creek Media, Inc. v. Boujaklian, No. C-02-3491, 2002 WL 1906620, at 
*4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2002) (noting that the Registration Approach “leads to an inefficient and peculiar 
result”). 
 92. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 620. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 620–21.  Section 410(d) gives another protection for a timelag by making the effective 
date of a registration the day on which the materials are received by the Copyright Office, the date from 
which statutory damages may be recovered.  See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 410, 504 (West 2010). 
 95. 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2006). 
 96. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 620. 
 97. Id.  This is especially the case given that an application for copyright registration can be 
made virtually instantly via the Copyright Office’s online application option.  See Electronic Copyright 
Office, www.copyright.gov/eco (last visited June 13, 2011). 
 98. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 621 (citing NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 34, 
§ 7.16[B][1][a][i]). 
 99. Id. at 621. 
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§ 411(a) is fulfilled when the Copyright Office receives a completed 
registration application.100  It found the text of the statute ambiguous 
and held that the Application Approach better afforded the broad 
protection intended by the 1976 Act, better promoted judicial economy, 
and better accomplished Congress’s goal of compiling a robust federal 
register of existing copyrights.101  In so holding, it vacated and reversed 
the district court’s dismissal, allowing Cosmetic Ideas’s infringement 
claim to proceed on the m 102
IV. DISCUSSION 
The following subparts detail how the Ninth Circuit erred in adopting 
the Application Approach.  Subparts A and B discuss the plain language 
of the statute and its legislative history, respectively, and find that both 
support the Registration Approach.  Subpart C finds that the Ninth 
Circuit incorrectly relied upon or ignored various sources of persuasive 
authority, including other federal circuit courts, the Copyright Office, 
and treatise authors.  Finally, subpart D notes several policy reasons for 
adopting the Registration Approach. 
A. Plain Language of the Copyright Act 
The Ninth Circuit noted that “[i]n interpreting a statutory provision, [a 
court begins] with the plain language of the statute.”103  The court, 
however, too quickly found ambiguity in § 411(a) and too quickly 
moved to the surrounding sections of the Act.  In doing so, it failed to 
put the relevant clause in its proper context.  The sections below 
examine (1) the relevant sentence of § 411(a), (2) § 411(a) as a whole, 
and (3) the related sections of the Copyright Act. 
1. The (Most) Relevant Sentence of § 411(a) 
The most relevant sentence of § 411(a) reads: “[N]o civil action for 
infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be 
instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has 
been made in accordance with this title.”104  By moving beyond  
§ 411(a) after simply finding that § 101 of the Act gave “no guidance” 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 621–22. 
 103. Id. at 616 (citing K & N Eng’g, Inc. v. Bluat, 510 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
 104. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (West 2010) (emphasis added). 
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for the definition of “registration,”105 the Ninth Circuit completely 
ignored the last part of the sentence, which requires that registration be 
“made in accordance with this title.”106  After looking to § 101 for the 
definition of “registration,” the appropriate next step should have been 
to examine the Act to determine the requirements of such registration.107  
In other words, the Ninth Circuit stopped at an incomplete definition of 
what registration is without proceeding to how registration is made, as 
required by § 411.108 
Other courts have not been so quick to make this error.  The Tenth 
Circuit examined the Act’s plain language in La Resolana Architects to 
determine when a registration has been “made in accordance with” the 
Copyright Act.109  Citing the relevant parts of the Act, the court found 
that 
Registration is satisfied by completing the following steps: 
a. application and payment of a fee, § 408; 
b. deposit of a copy of the copyrightable material, § 408; 
c. examination by the Register of Copyrights, § 410; 
d. registration (or refusal to register) by the Register, § 410; 
e. issuance of certificate of registration, § 410.110 
The court went on to note that nowhere did this “series of affirmative 
steps by both the applicant and the Copyright Office” indicate that 
“mere receipt of copyrightable material” would be sufficient to establish 
registration under § 411.111  Had the Ninth Circuit similarly attempted to 
flesh out the full meaning of § 411(a), it would have likely found that 
receipt by the Copyright Office of an application, a deposit, and fees was 
only part of a registration “made in accordance with” the Copyright 
Act.112 
 105. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 616 (“‘Registration’ is unhelpfully defined as a ‘registration of a 
claim in the original or the renewed and extended term of copyright.’  Because the clause at issue gives 
no guidance in interpreting the meaning of ‘registration,’ we turn to the language of the statute as a 
whole to determine the intended meaning.” (quoting 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2010)). 
 106. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a). 
 107. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (“The plainness or ambiguity of 
statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that 
language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”) (citations omitted). 
 108. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a). 
 109. La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 
2005), abrogated in part by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010). 
 110. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 408, 410 (2006)). 
 111. La Resolana Architects, 416 F.3d at 1200.  The court further stated that a copyright holder is 
entitled to sue for infringement only after “those steps are followed and registration is ‘made.’”  Id. at 
1201. 
 112. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a). 
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2. Section 411(a) as a Whole 
Additionally, upon finding that “registration” had an ambiguous 
meaning as defined by § 101, the Ninth Circuit jumped immediately to 
examining §§ 408–412, the sections of the Act that govern copyright 
registration.113  Instead, it should have placed the relevant sentence in its 
immediate context by next examining § 411(a) as a whole.114 
Reading the (most) relevant sentence along with the subsequent 
sentence is particularly illuminating: 
[N]o civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States 
work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the 
copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title.  In any case, 
however, where the deposit, application, and fee required for registration 
have been delivered to the Copyright Office in proper form and 
registration has been refused, the applicant is entitled to institute a civil 
action for infringement if notice thereof, with a copy of the complaint, is 
served on the Register of Copyrights.115 
The second sentence indicates that delivery of the requisite materials 
and the refusal of a copyright registration are two separate acts.  If 
refusal of registration is a discrete act, it then follows that its opposite, 
approval of registration, is also a discrete act.  Therefore, whether a 
registration is refused or approved, the Register must perform an 
affirmative action before the applicant may file suit.  The Ninth Circuit 
noted as much when it acknowledged that “this subsection could be read 
to mean that Congress intended registration to require acceptance or 
refusal by the Register, not mere delivery.”116  Plainly read together, the 
two sentences provide a simple roadmap for infringement litigation: (1) 
if the Register examines and approves a copyright’s registration, the 
litigant may then sue for copyright infringement with no additional 
steps; and (2) if the Register examines and refuses the registration, the 
litigant may still sue so long as he or she provides the Register with 
notice. 
 113. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F.3d 612, 616–17 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, IAC/InterActiveCorp, v. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 686 (2010).  Strangely, the court looks 
to § 410(a) and then returns to § 411(a), which the court readily admits “contain(s) language that 
suggests that registration requires some affirmative steps to be taken by the Copyright Office.”  Id. at 
617.  It finds no language in § 411(a), the very subsection at issue, that suggests that mere receipt of an 
application effects a registration, yet it finds the statute ambiguous.  Id. at 617–18. 
 114. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Company, 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (stating that determine 
ambiguity by “the specific context in which that language is used”). 
 115. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (emphasis added). 
 116. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 617 (citing, e.g., Strategy Source, Inc. v. Lee, 233 F. Supp. 2d 1, 
3–4 (D.D.C. 2002)) (citation omitted). 
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Congress used the same verb, “institut[e],” in both sentences.117  This 
redundant usage informs our understanding of Congress’s intent.  In 
general, words within the same statute should be given the same 
meaning.118  Under certain circumstances, however, the Application 
Approach requires two different meanings for the verb “institut[e].”119  
Under this approach, when a registration application is submitted, a 
litigant may “initiate” an infringement suit; if the Register subsequently 
refuses to register the copyright, the suit may assumedly “continue” 
upon notice to the Register.120  On the other hand, the meaning of the 
word “institut[e]” is static under the Registration Approach: a suit may 
be “initiated” upon registration approval, or it may be “initiated” upon 
registration refusal.  Because Congress used the same word twice, it 
likely intended this internal consistency and did not seem to contemplate 
the institution of a civil action when the validity of a copyright 
registration was still in doubt.121  The plainest reading of the statute, the 
reading that gives a consistent meaning to the word “institut[e],” makes 
the Register a gatekeeper who must affirmatively approve or refuse a 
copyright registration before a litigant may initiate an infringement suit. 
Furthermore, courts that have adopted the Application Approach give 
little credit to Congress’s drafting prowess.  Had Congress intended an 
infringement action to be able to be instituted when the Copyright Office 
received the appropriate application, fees, and deposit, it could have 
clearly written the statute as such.  Indeed, it did so when describing 
what to do when a registration was refused.122  Fewer definitional 
acrobatics are needed when § 411(a) is read under the Registration 
 117. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (noting that no civil action “shall be instituted” until registration; upon 
refusal, the applicant “is entitled to institute a civil action” with notice to the Register (emphasis added)). 
 118. See Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990) (presume that “identical words used in 
different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning” (internal citations omitted)); 
MAXWELL ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 311–12 (Roy Wilson ed., 11th ed. 1962) (It is 
“reasonable to presume that the same meaning is implied by the use of the same expression in every part 
of the Act.”). 
 119. Webster’s Dictionary defines “institute” as “to originate” or to “initiate.”  WEBSTER’S THIRD 
NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 1171 (Philip Babcock Gove ed. 1981). 
 120. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a).  This inconsistency is particularly problematic considering that (1) 
this second usage (to “continue”) is found nowhere in Webster’s definition of “institute,” and (2) the 
word “institute” is used in such close proximity to itself (in back-to-back sentences within the same 
subsection).  Were Application Approach courts to apply a consistent meaning to the word “institute,” 
they would have to read the statute as allowing the initiation of a suit upon an application for registration 
and then the apparent (and senseless) re-initiation of the suit upon refusal of registration.  A suit cannot 
begin after it has already begun. 
 121. Put another way, Congress provided no guidance regarding what an applicant must do if 
registration has been refused after a civil suit has been instituted. 
 122. 17 U.S.C.A. 411(a) (discussing the situation “where the deposit, application, and fee required 
for registration have been delivered to the Copyright Office in proper form and registration has been 
refused”). 
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Approach. 
3. Other Provisions 
The Ninth Circuit looked to provisions beyond § 411(a), namely 
§ 408 and § 410, in an effort to resolve the perceived ambiguity.123  
Including the latter half of § 411(a) stated above, the court found four 
other sections relevant to when a copyright is “registered.”  It effectively 
found that the Registration/Application Approach scorecard was 2–1–1: 
that § 411(a) and § 410(a) lent support to the Registration Approach; 
that § 408(a) lent support to the Application Approach; and that § 410(d) 
could support either.124  This analysis and finding of ambiguity, 
however, may have been results-driven as the court just as easily could 
have found that all four subsections favored the Registration Approach. 
The Ninth Circuit correctly noted that § 410(a) contains “language 
that suggests that registration requires some affirmative steps” by the 
Copyright Office.125  Section 410(a) reads: 
[w]hen, after examination, the Register of Copyrights determines that, in 
accordance with the provisions of this title, the material deposited 
constitutes copyrightable subject matter and that the other legal and 
formal requirements of this title have been met, the Register shall register 
the claim and issue to the applicant a certificate of registration under the 
seal of the Copyright Office.126 
Section 410(a) clearly requires the Register’s examination and 
approval before a registration is complete.127  The requirement of such 
an affirmative act cuts against the Application Approach, and it is 
difficult to understand how language that is merely arguably ambiguous 
elsewhere could trump the clarity of § 410(a).  This view is further 
supported by the text of § 411(a), which seems to contemplate an 
approval-or-refusal regime of copyright registration, discussed above in 
Part IV.A.2. 
The Ninth Circuit found that § 408(a) “blurs the line between 
application and registration and favors the application approach.”128   
 123. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactive, 606 F.3d 612, 616–618 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
IAC/InterActiveCorp, v. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 686 (2010). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 617. 
 126. 17 U.S.C. § 410(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 127. Id.  Although the verbs are not presented sequentially in the subsection, arranging them in 
such a manner provides a clear roadmap for the registration process: (1) deposit, (2) examine, (3) 
determine, (4) register, and (5) issue. 
 128. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 617. 
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The relevant text reads, “the owner of copyright or of any exclusive 
right in the work may obtain registration . . . by delivering to the 
Copyright Office the deposit specified by this section, together with the 
application and fee specified.”129  The court found that this section 
implied that “the sole requirement for obtaining registration is delivery 
of the appropriate documents and fee.”130  This reading gives short shrift 
to practical considerations: relevant materials must be submitted as an 
initial step in the process before the Register can examine and register a 
copyrightable work.  The heading of § 408, “Copyright [R]egistration in 
[G]eneral,”131 also indicates that the first paragraph may simply be 
giving a general overview of the process rather than describing the nuts-
and-bolts of the process found in subsequent sections.132  Given the 
heading, it is appropriate to read subsection (a) as being a general 
outline that merely indicates the materials that the Register will need in 
order to grant a registration. 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit found that § 410(d) could be read to support 
either the Registration Approach or the Application Approach.  The 
section reads, “[t]he effective date of a copyright registration is the day 
on which an application, deposit, and fee, which are later determined by 
the Register of Copyrights . . . to be acceptable for registration, have all 
been received in the Copyright Office.”133  The court noted that the 
back-dating supported the view “that application is the critical event,”134 
but it also found that “the statute could be read to require action by the 
Register to effect registration.”135 
The court, however, took no notice of the fact that § 410(d) uses the 
phrase “effective date.”  None of the sections discussing registration as a 
precondition to bringing an infringement suit uses the phrase “effective 
date,” but one other section notably does: § 412.136  Section 412 
describes “certain remedies” such as statutory damages and attorney’s 
 129. 17 U.S.C. 408(a) (2006). 
 130. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 617.  Although the court found that the text implied adherence to 
the Application Approach, it cited (but did not discuss) a contrary district court case from within its own 
circuit.  Id. (citing and overruling Ryan v. Carl Corp., No. C-97-3873, 1998 WL 320817, at *3 (N.D. 
Cal. June 15, 1998) (noting that § 408(a) means “merely that the delivery of the application is a step the 
applicant must take, not that delivery is sufficient by itself to obtain a registration”) (citations omitted)). 
 131. 17 U.S.C. § 408. 
 132. The heading of a section may be used to resolve ambiguities in a statute.  See SUTHERLAND, 
2A STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:14 (Norman Singer ed., 7th ed. 2007) (“[W]here 
the meaning of the act is ambiguous, . . . the headings may serve as an aid to legislative intent.”). 
 133. 17 U.S.C. § 410(d) (2006). 
 134. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 618. 
 135. Id. 
 136. 17 U.S.C.A. § 412 (West 2010).  The heading of § 412 reads “Registration as a prerequisite 
to certain remedies.”  Id. 
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fees that are only available for infringement occurring after the effective 
date of registration.137  The Act quite clearly describes how to determine 
the effective date138 and how it affects infringement remedies.139  The 
plain language of the statute, however, gives no indication regarding the 
effective date’s effect on the registration itself or on when an 
infringement action may be instituted.  Because the effective date of 
registration is described in § 410(d), ignored in § 411(a), and referenced 
in § 412, the most sensible interpretation is that the effective date is only 
relevant to remedies and not to the institution of an infringement suit.  
The back-dating that created ambiguity in the Ninth Circuit’s 
determination of registration140 turns out to be irrelevant to the 
discussion of § 411. 
After noting two sections that supported the Registration  
Approach,141 the Ninth Circuit observed that “[o]ther sections of the  
Act, however, cast doubt on this interpretation.”142  The court’s doubts 
were unfounded, however.  As described above, both §§ 408(a) and 
410(d), are entirely consistent with the Registration Approach, which 
can and should be adopted based on the plain language of the Copyright 
Act.143 
B. Legislative History 
In addition to disregarding the plain language of § 411(a), the Ninth 
Circuit’s adoption of the Application Approach also ignored the statute’s 
legislative history.  The report of the House Judiciary Committee144 
clearly contemplated the retention of an active role by the Register of 
Copyrights while giving copyright holders the right to sue should their 
registration be refused. 
Section 411’s precondition of registration was not unique to the 
Copyright Act of 1976.145  As one commentator wrote, “[T]he 
 137. Id.  See also 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 504, 505 (West 2010) (describing possible damages and 
attorney’s fees, respectively). 
 138. 17 U.S.C. § 410(d) (“The effective date of a copyright registration is the day on which an 
application, deposit, and fee . . . have all been received in the Copyright Office.”). 
 139. 17 U.S.C.A. § 412 (“[N]o award of statutory damages or of attorney’s fees . . . shall be made 
for . . . any infringement of copyright commenced after first publication of the work and before the 
effective date of its registration . . . .”). 
 140. See Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 618. 
 141. Id. at 617 (finding that §§ 410(a) and 411(a) “contain language that suggests that registration 
requires some affirmative steps”). 
 142. Id. 
 143. See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 408–12 (West 2010). 
 144. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1476 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659. 
 145. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 et seq. (West 2010). 
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requirement that the registration formality be complied with as a 
prerequisite to the institution of an infringement action has been a 
feature of federal U.S. copyright law since 1790.”146  The first federal 
copyright act in 1790 required the deposit of a copy of the work with the 
clerk of the local district court.147  Section 12 of the 1909 Act (later 
renumbered to Section 13) retained the registration requirement as a 
prerequisite to suit.148 
In 1956, the Second Circuit addressed the prerequisite of registration 
under the 1909 Act.149  In Vacheron, the federal district court judge 
rejected a wrist watch designer’s copyright registration, finding that a 
watch was not a “work of art” under the 1909 Act.150  Because the 1909 
Act “forbade any action for infringement of the copyright when the 
Register of Copyrights had refused, as he did, to accept the watch as 
copyrightable under § 5(g),” the Second Circuit held that the 
infringement action had been properly dismissed.151  Furthermore, the 
court found that the prerequisite of “registration” required affirmative 
action by the Register.152 
When Congress passed the Copyright Act of 1976, the House 
Judiciary Committee wrote that the purpose of the first sentence of 
§ 411(a) was to “restat[e] the present statutory requirement that 
registration must be made before a suit for copyright infringement is 
instituted,” while the purpose of the second and third sentences were to 
“alter the present law as interpreted in Vacheron.”153  In other words, the 
1976 Act did not disturb the registration requirement of the 1909 Act, 
which had long been interpreted as requiring affirmative action by the 
 146. WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 17:64 (2010).  The author also notes that 
§ 411(a) is “remarkably like” the 1710 Statute of Anne, England’s original copyright statute.  Id. 
§ 17:64.10 (citing 8 Anne c. 19 §§ 1:5-9 (1710)). 
 147. Id. § 17:64.30 (“‘[N]o person shall be entitled to the benefit of this act . . . unless he shall 
first deposit, and in all other cases, unless he shall before publication deposit a printed copy of the title 
of’” the work. (quoting Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124, § 3)). 
 148. Id. § 17:64.40 (“No action or proceeding shall be maintained for infringement of copyright in 
any work until the provisions of this Act with respect to the deposit of copies and registration of such 
work shall have been complied with.” (citing Act of March 4, 1909, 60th Cong., 2d Sess.)). 
 149. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Courltre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co., 260 F.2d 637 (2d 
Cir. 1958). 
 150. Id. at 638–39 (noting that copyrightable subject material includes “‘works of art; models or 
designs for works of art’” (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 5(g) of the Copyright Act of 1909)). 
 151. Id. at 639 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 13 of the 1909 Act). 
 152. Id. at 640–41 (The Act “denies the right to sue for infringement ‘until the provisions of this 
title with respect to the deposit of copies and registration of such work shall have been complied with,’ 
and that imports more than the mere ‘deposit of copies.’  Since the owner must submit an application 
and pay the required fees in order to make a deposit, . . . we can think of no other added condition for 
‘registration’ but acceptance by the Register.” (quoting 17 U.S.C. §§ 13, 202.3(b))). 
 153. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5773. 
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Register of Copyrights.  The only alteration Congress intended to make 
was to allow a litigant whose registration had been refused by the 
Register to bring an infringement suit so long as notice is served on the 
Register, who may then choose to join the suit on the issue of 
registrability.154 
Furthermore, the legislative history of § 410 indicates that registration 
requires an affirmative action by the Register of Copyrights.  The House 
Judiciary Committee noted that “[t]he first two subsections of section 
410 set forth the two basic duties of the Register of Copyrights with 
respect to copyright registration: (1) to register the claim and issue a 
certificate if the [application is approved], and (2) to refuse registration 
and notify the applicant if the” application is rejected.155  This report 
shows that Congress envisioned the Register taking an active role.  Read 
in conjunction with the text of § 411(a), which requires that registration 
be “made in accordance with this title,”156 it seems clear that registration 
is “made” by actions of the Register, not merely by actions of the 
applicant; indeed, it is one of the “two basic duties” of the Register.157  
The process envisioned by Congress seems clear: the Register will 
receive the materials, examine them, and then either register or refuse 
the claim.  The Application Approach is incompatible with this simple 
reading of the statute, of the history of the Act, and of Congress’s intent. 
C. Misplaced Reliance on Persuasive Authority 
In following the Application Approach, the Ninth Circuit misread or 
ignored several sources of persuasive authority.  The next sections will 
examine (1) its overstatement of the circuit split, (2) its snub of the 
Copyright Office, and (3) its selective and uncritical use of 
commentators. 
1. Misreading the Circuits 
The Ninth Circuit rather cavalierly noted that its sister circuits were 
evenly split, two to two, between the Application and the Registration 
Approaches.  It simply noted that “the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have 
adopted the application approach,”158 and that “[t]he Tenth and Eleventh 
 154. See id. (“Under section 411, a rejected claimant who has properly applied for registration 
may maintain an infringement suit if notice of it is served on the Register of Copyrights.”). 
 155. Id. (emphasis added). 
 156. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (West 2010). 
 157. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476. 
 158. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F.3d 612, 616 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Apple 
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Circuits have adopted the registration approach.”159  It made no analysis, 
however, of the relative strength of the holdings.  In particular, the 
Seventh Circuit’s purported adoption of the Application Approach is 
suspect. 
The chosen approaches of several of the circuits are unambiguous.  
The Fifth Circuit endorses the Application Approach.160  The Tenth and 
Eleventh Circuits, on the other hand, clearly endorse the Registration 
Approach.161  Additionally, prior to Cosmetic Ideas, the Tenth Circuit 
had been the only circuit court to provide a detailed analysis of the two 
approaches.162 
The position of the Seventh Circuit, however, is not as clear.  In 
Chicago Board of Education v. Substance, Inc., the alleged infringer 
argued that the school board did not have a valid copyright registration 
on the tests that the defendant published.163  Writing for the Seventh 
Circuit, Judge Posner said: 
Although a copyright no longer need be registered with the Copyright 
Office to be valid, an application for registration must be filed before the 
copyright can be sued upon.  In its application for registration the school 
board claimed to have a copyright in the entire contents of the tests.  Had 
the claim been false, the registration should not have issued and maybe 
therefore the copyright could not have been sued upon.164 
Barrel Prods., Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 386–87 (5th Cir. 1984); Chicago Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, 
Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2003)), cert. denied, IAC/InterActiveCorp, v. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc., 131 
S. Ct. 686 (2010). 
 159. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 616 (citing La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel 
Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1202–04 (10th Cir. 2005), abrogated in part by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 
130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010); M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1489 (11th Cir. 
1990), abrogated in part by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010)). 
 160. See Apple Barrel Prods., 730 F.2d at 386–87.  Parroting the general requirement of § 408 
without offering any analysis of § 411(a), the Fifth Circuit noted that as a precondition to a copyright 
infringement, one merely needs to prove “payment of the required fee, deposit of the work in question, 
and receipt by the Copyright Office of a registration application,” but not actual possession of a 
registration certificate.  Id. (citing NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 34, § 7.16[B][1]). 
 161. See M.G.B. Homes, 903 F.2d at 1488–89 (dismissing an action for “failure to satisfy the 
condition precedent of having registered its copyright before initiating [an] infringement action” after an 
application had been filed but before a registration certificate had been received); La Resolana 
Architects, 416 F.3d at 1205 (noting that the Copyright Act requires “actual registration by the Register 
of Copyrights” and not “mere submission of a copyright application” before an infringement action may 
be instituted). 
 162. La Resolana Architects, 416 F.3d at 1201–05.  As stated above, the court then adopted the 
Registration Approach.  Id. at 1205. 
 163. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 354 F.3d at 631. 
 164. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).  Judge Posner then mused in parentheses, “(Or 
maybe yes, because the copyright would have been registered, and because the statute requires only a 
refused registration, which might be the equivalent of an improper registration, not an actual 
registration, as the premise for the suit.  We need not decide.)”  Id. 
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Judge Posner may be adopting the Application Approach, requiring 
only that “an application . . . be filed.”165  He also says, however, that 
for a false or improper application, “the registration should not have 
been issued,”166 indicating that an affirmative action by the Copyright 
Office is required.  In the end, the Seventh Circuit did not expressly rule 
on whether the Registration or the Application Approach should be 
adopted.167  Furthermore, Judge Posner’s analysis seemed to conflate 
application, registration, and issuance, which muddied the waters even 
further.168  Therefore, the Seventh Circuit’s position is not as clear as the 
Ninth Circuit makes it out to be, and it certainly does not stand on the 
same strong foundation of reasoning as does the Tenth Circuit’s 
adoption of the Registration Approach in La Resolana Architects.169  
Had the Ninth Circuit conducted a more thorough analysis of the circuit 
split, it might have been persuaded to endorse the Registration Approach 
in Cosmetic Ideas.170 
2. Ignoring the Copyright Office’s Own Interpretation 
In deciding Cosmetic Ideas, the Ninth Circuit completely ignored the 
Copyright Office’s own interpretation of when registration is 
complete.171  Although a legislative office’s interpretation of a statute is 
not binding on a court, the Copyright Office’s reading of § 411(a) 
should hold at least some persuasive value. 
The Copyright Office is a service unit of the Library of Congress, 
which in turn is an agency of the legislative branch of the 
government.172  At least one of the Copyright Office’s own publications 
plainly adopts the Registration Approach.  Copyright Circular 10 reads, 
“the Copyright Office must have acted on your application before you 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. (emphasis added). 
 167. Although Judge Posner dismissed the alleged infringer’s argument as “frivolous,” his 
reasoning on this point did not rest on when a copyright registration is effective.  Instead, he found that 
any test questions that the plaintiff did not directly author would likely be considered “works made for 
hire” so that “the school board would have owned the copyright anyway.”  Id. 
 168. See id. (“Although a copyright no longer need be registered with the Copyright Office to be 
valid, an application for registration must be filed before the copyright can be sued upon. . . . Had the 
claim been false, the registration should not have issued . . . .”). 
 169. La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realty Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2005), 
abrogated in part by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010). 
 170. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
IAC/InterActiveCorp, v. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 686 (2010). 
 171. Id. 
 172. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 1A, A BRIEF INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY (2010), 
available at http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ1a.html. 
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can file a suit for copyright infringement.”173  As the sentence discusses 
the precondition required to file an infringement lawsuit, it seems to be 
directly addressing § 411(a).  The phrase “must have acted on” indicates 
that mere receipt of an application by the Copyright Office is not 
sufficient to effect a “registration” under the preconditions of § 411(a).  
Instead, an affirmative act by the Office is required, such as examination 
followed by approval or rejection.174 
The Copyright Office is directly under Congress’s control.  If 
Congress were unhappy with the Copyright Office’s adoption of the 
Registration Approach, Congress could have instructed the Copyright 
Office to change its approach, amended the statute to add clarity, or 
done both.  By taking no action, Congress has tacitly approved of the 
Registration Approach, indicating that the approach is in line with its 
intent in passing § 411(a). 
3. Copyright Commentators 
Throughout its decision to adopt the Application Approach, the Ninth 
Circuit leans on the persuasive authority of “the leading treatise on 
copyright,” Nimmer on Copyright.175  Other commentators, however, 
flatly reject Nimmer’s reasoning and advocate the Registration 
Approach.176 
William F. Patry, author of Patry on Copyright, writes that the courts 
that have adopted the Application Approach “were led astray by 
Nimmer.”177  Patry continues, “Nimmer’s view is not an interpretation 
of the statute: it is a flagrant disregard of the statute, its legislative 
history, its statutory history, in short, every evidence of Congress’s 
intent.”178  He goes on to criticize Nimmer’s disregard of the plain 
 173. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 10, SPECIAL HANDLING (2010), available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ10.pdf. 
 174. It may also be noted that Circular 10 was revised in the same month (May, 2010) as the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Cosmetic Ideas (May 25, 2010), indicating that this is the Office’s most 
current thinking, even in light of the circuit split that existed prior to Cosmetic Ideas. 
 175. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d 612, 620 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 
34).  The court found Nimmer’s reasoning persuasive on several points: (1) Because a plaintiff will 
ultimately be allowed to proceed with a suit regardless of the Copyright Office’s approval or rejection, 
“it makes little sense to create a period of ‘legal limbo’ in which suit is barred.”  Id. at 620 (quotation 
and citation omitted).  (2) Delay by the Copyright Office may lead to the expiration of the statute of 
limitations, “occasion[ing] complete inability to recover damages.”  Id.  (3) “[T]he pace of litigation 
entails that the Copyright Office will typically have granted or refused registration during [an 
infringement suit’s] pendency,” enabling the Register to join a suit should it choose to do so following 
the rejection of an application.  Id. at 621 (quotation and citation omitted). 
 176. See PATRY, supra note 146, § 17:78. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id.  In the same section, Patry also points out, “Tellingly, the Solicitor General of the United 
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language and structure of § 411(a), Nimmer’s misplaced reliance on and 
misreading of § 410,179 and Nimmer’s purported inversion of the 
registration process.180  Patry clearly feels that the Registration 
Approach is both the better approach and the one required both by the 
plain text of the statute and by Congress’s intent. 
While Nimmer is admittedly the leading commentator on copyright 
law, wise men may be wrong.181  Patry makes a compelling argument 
both for his case and against Nimmer’s regarding the correct 
interpretation of § 411.  Because the Ninth Circuit cited Nimmer without 
examining his argument,182 the court may be lumped in with others who 
“were led astray by Nimmer.”183 
D. The Registration Approach Best Meets Policy Concerns 
The Ninth Circuit adopted the Application Approach in part because 
the court believed that the Application Approach better fulfilled 
desirable policy goals such as broad copyright protection, a robust 
federal register, fairness, and conservation of judicial resources.184  The 
court, however, failed to recognize that the Registration Approach 
fulfilled these policy goals as well as or better than the Application 
Approach.  The following four sections address the Registration 
States rejected Nimmer’s theory in her amicus brief to the Supreme Court in the Reed Elsevier case.”  
Id. (referencing Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010)). 
 179. Id. § 17:78 (“Nimmer’s reading of section 410 was undertaken . . . not to illuminate the 
meaning and purpose of section 411(a), but to subvert it.”). 
 180. Id. (“[W]hile the Copyright Office does not grant copyrights, only the Copyright Office 
‘makes’ registration of a claim to copyright within the meaning of section 411(a).  Nimmer inverts the 
statute by having the applicant effectively ‘make’ the registration.”). 
 181. For example, before the U.S. Supreme Court decided Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick, Nimmer 
wrote, “registration is a condition precedent for a court to exercise jurisdiction in an infringement case,” 
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 34, § 7.16[B][1][a] (Rel. 78-5/2009), while noting in a footnote that “a 
minority view treats these matters [of registrations] are [sic] prerequisites for claim-processing, not as 
strictly jurisdictional.”  Id. § 7.16[B][1][a], n.38.3a.  The U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the “minority 
view.”  Reed Elsevier, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1247 (2010) (“Section 411(a) thus imposes a type of 
precondition to suit that supports nonjurisdictional treatment.”).  Nimmer’s treatise has since been 
revised.  See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 34, § 7.16[B][1][a] (Rel. 82-8/2010) (“Registration is a 
condition precedent for an infringement case to move forward in federal court.”). 
 182. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F.3d 612, 620, 621 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, IAC/InterActiveCorp, v. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 686 (2010). 
 183. PATRY, supra note 146, § 17:78; see also Ann Bartow, The Hegemony of the Copyright 
Treatise, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 581, 583 (2004) (noting that while Nimmer on Copyright and treatises in 
general “can be quite valuable, their impact on the law can actually be negative if they are too heavily 
and unquestioningly relied on”). 
 184. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 621 (“This interpretation ensures the broad copyright protection 
that the 1976 Act provided[,] . . . accomplishes the central purpose of registration—the compilation of a 
robust national register of existing copyrights—and at the same time avoids unfairness and waste of 
judicial resources.”). 
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Approach in relation to the policy goals of (1) a robust federal register, 
(2) fairness, (3) judicial economy, and (4) the relaxation of formalities. 
1. Robust Register 
Congress incentivized copyright registration with the goal of 
maintaining a robust federal register, finding such a register “useful and 
important to users and the public at large.”185  The Ninth Circuit found 
that this goal “is accomplished equally by the registration and 
application approaches.”186  In reality, however, this is likely not 
correct, as the Registration Approach may encourage more copyright 
holders to register their works, leading to a more robust register than one 
under an Application Approach regime.  As the Cosmetic Ideas court 
noted, “copyright holders frequently register specifically for the purpose 
of being able to bring suit.”187  Presumably, copyright holders whose 
works are being infringed would like to bring suit as soon as possible in 
order to stop the infringement.  By requiring the issuance of a certificate 
as a precondition of an infringement suit, the Registration Approach, in 
effect, incentivizes early registration by disincentivizing registration at 
the time of infringement. 
The Application Approach gives little incentive for early registration 
in general and no incentive at all for the registration of non-infringed 
works.  Considering the minimal time, effort, and money required to 
apply for a copyright registration, copyright holders suffer little if they 
wait until infringement occurs before applying for a registration under 
the Application Approach; they will be able to bring suit as soon as the 
Register receives the materials.188  Consequently, if the Application 
Approach gains widespread acceptance among the federal circuits, it is 
conceivable that the future bulk of the federal register will consist only 
of infringed works.  In sum, the Application Approach gives little reason 
to register non-infringed works and imposes little penalty for delaying 
registration until they are in fact infringed, doing little to achieve 
Congress’s goal of a robust register. 
On the other hand, under the Registration Approach the copyright 
holder will suffer an inevitable delay between the time of registration 
application and approval while the Register receives and examines the 
 185. Id. at 619 n.10 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976)). 
 186. Id. at 620. 
 187. Id. at 619. 
 188. This process will usually be complete within just a few days—while the application, deposit, 
and fees are in the mail (or fewer, using the online submission process). 
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copyright application.189  Should infringing activity occur during this 
time, the infringer can continue to profit from the wrongful activity 
while the copyright holder awaits approval of his or her registration.  
While this by itself seems unjust, a copyright holder can avoid this 
frustration by applying for registration soon after the copyrightable work 
is created and before infringement occurs.190  Doing so will increase his 
likelihood of holding a registration certificate at the time of 
infringement, enabling the copyright holder to sue immediately.  Of 
course, it is inevitable that infringement of only some of these works 
will occur, resulting in the registration of both infringed and non-
infringed works as well as a more robust federal register. 
2. Fairness 
The Ninth Circuit felt as though the Application Approach “avoid[ed] 
unfairness”191 by allowing a litigant to bring suit almost immediately 
rather than being forced to endure a prolonged period of infringement.192  
The court also feared that the Registration Approach could lead to the 
expiration of the statute of limitations while the copyright holder awaits 
a decision by the Register of Copyrights.193  It found that “[o]nly the 
application approach fully protects litigants from any disadvantage 
caused by this timelag.”194  The court’s fears, however, were unfounded 
and overstated, and they can be fully addressed and resolved by the 
Registration Approach. 
First of all, given that the plain language and legislative history of 
§ 411(a) contemplate affirmative action by the Register before an 
infringement suit may be instituted,195 it is unclear how requiring a 
 189. As discussed below, the copyright holder will not ultimately be harmed by this time lag, as 
the effective date of registration (and therefore the date from which statutory damages may be 
recovered) is the date that the application was received by the Copyright Office.  See 17 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 410(d), 412 (West 2010). 
 190. As an additional incentive to register a work early in its lifecycle, a registration certificate 
constitutes prima facie evidence of the copyright’s validity only if registration was made before or 
within five years of the first publication of the work.  17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (2006).  If registration occurs 
outside this window (for example, in response to infringement occurring six years after publication), 
then the certificate will be awarded evidentiary weight according to the discretion of the court.  Id. 
 191. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 621. 
 192. Id. at 620 (“The application approach avoids this legal limbo—and avoids prolonging the 
period of infringement—by allowing a litigant to proceed with an infringement suit as soon as he has 
taken all of the necessary steps to register the copyright at issue.”). 
 193. Id. at 620–21. 
 194. Id. 
 195. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (West 2010); see also supra Part IV.A.3 regarding “effective date” 
and remedies. 
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litigant to fulfill a precondition to filing a lawsuit is in any way “unfair.”  
Copyright protection and enforcement are the results of legislative 
grace.196  Registration is a statutory requirement of an infringement 
action, no different than the filing of a complaint or the service of 
process. 
The court is also unclear on why forcing a litigant to endure a period 
of alleged infringement is necessarily unfair.  The Registration 
Approach penalizes a copyright holder’s inaction in terms of time and 
mental frustration, but not in terms of the ultimate damages that the 
copyright holder will be entitled to receive.  Section 410(d)’s backdating 
provision makes the effective date of registration the date on which the 
Copyright Office receives the application, deposit, and fee,197 and 
statutory damages and attorney’s fees can be awarded for any 
infringement occurring after this effective date.198  Therefore, the 
copyright holder will be able to recover for any damages incurred while 
the Register processes the application. 
Finally, when proposing the “worst-case scenario” in which a 
copyright holder loses the ability to sue due to the running of the statute 
of limitations,199 the court neglected to acknowledge the Copyright 
Office’s “Special Handling” option.  While a registration certificate may 
normally take up to several months to issue, an applicant may elect to 
pay an extra fee for “Special Handling,” which is “the expedited 
processing of an online or paper application for registration of a claim to 
copyright.”200  It is available in limited circumstances or for compelling 
reasons, one of which is “pending or prospective litigation.”201  This 
 196. In general, the United States does not recognize “moral rights” of authors and treats 
copyrights purely as personal property that may be freely transferred.  See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal 
Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2–3 
(1985) (“The 1976 Act does not purport to protect the creator, but rather the copyright owner.  
Nevertheless, a creator, regardless of whether he holds the copyright in his work, has a personal interest 
in preserving the artistic integrity of his work and compelling recognition for his authorship.  In many 
European and Third World nations personal rights are protected by a legal doctrine commonly known as 
the moral right.”).  Visual artists, however, are offered some protection regarding their reputation and 
distortions of their work, even if the artist does not own the work’s copyright.  See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) 
(2006); Edward J. Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward a Federal System of Moral 
Rights Protection for Visual Art, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 945 (1990). 
 197. 17 U.S.C. § 410(d) (2006). 
 198. 17 U.S.C.A. § 412 (West 2010).  Additionally, a copyright holder remains entitled to recover 
actual damages for any infringement that occurred before the effective date of registration.  17 U.S.C.A. 
§ 504 (West 2010). 
 199. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F.3d 612, 620 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
IAC/InterActiveCorp, v. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 686 (2010). 
 200. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 10, SPECIAL HANDLING 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ10.pdf. 
 201. Id.  Other circumstances include “customs matters, or contract or publishing deadlines that 
necessitate the expedited issuance of a certificate.”  Id. 
29
Darley-Emerson: “REGISTRATION . . . MEANS A REGISTRATION”: A CRITIQUE OF THE NINT
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011
K-EMERSON 9/24/2011  4:27:27 PM 
1576 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
 
request can be quickly made online, and “[o]nce a request for special 
handling is received and approved, every attempt is made to process the 
claim . . . within five working days.”202 
Therefore, a copyright holder who is nearing the end of the statute of 
limitations may expedite registration through the “Special Handling” 
procedure.  As the Copyright Office aims roughly for a one-week 
turnaround time,203 the applicant should suffer little delay in being able 
to file an infringement suit.  Additionally, the large “Special Handling” 
fee204 further incentivizes early application so that the fee can be 
avoided, which should in turn bolster the number of works registered 
with the Copyright Office.  While it is true that the Application 
Approach might allow the copyright holder to file an infringement 
action perhaps a week or two earlier, this small benefit to the copyright 
holder is offset and overshadowed by the furtherance of Congress’s goal 
of maintaining a robust federal register.205 
3. Judicial Efficiency 
The Ninth Circuit found that the Application Approach “‘best 
effectuate[s] the interest of justice and promote[s] judicial economy.’”206  
However, in its desire to “avoi[d] . . . waste of judicial resources,”207 the 
court did not properly consider the ways in which the Registration 
Approach also promotes as much or more judicial economy. 
According to the Ninth Circuit, the Application Approach avoids 
unnecessary delays that put the copyright holder in a “period of ‘legal 
limbo’ in which suit is barred,”208 but a copyright holder need not 
endure a prolonged period of infringement before bringing suit.  As 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. (“within five working days”). 
 204. Copyright Fees, http://www.copyright.gov/docs/fees.html (last visited June 13, 2011) (fee 
currently $760 per expedited claim). 
 205. Courts should also discourage copyright holders who have notice of infringement from 
sleeping on their rights.  A copyright holder who waits until the end of the three year period to register 
would be similarly disadvantaged as one who waits two years and 364 days to talk to his or her lawyer, 
as it will take time for the lawyer to draft and file a complaint.  The statute of limitations exists to 
encourage prompt action by a litigant and fairness to the opposition. 
 206. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F.3d 612, 621 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Int’l 
Kitchen Exhaust Cleaning Ass’n v. Power Washers of N. Am., 81 F. Supp. 2d 70, 72 (D.D.C. 2000), 
cert. denied, IAC/InterActiveCorp, v. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 686 (2010)). 
 207. Id. (“‘Nothing is better settled than that statutes should receive a sensible construction, such 
as will effectuate the legislative intention, and, if possible, so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd 
conclusion.’” (quoting Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U.S. 47, 59 (1892))). 
 208. Id. at 619–20 (“‘[G]iven that the claimant . . . will ultimately be allowed to proceed 
regardless of how the Copyright Office treats the application, it makes little sense to create a period of 
‘legal limbo’ in which suit is barred.’” (quoting NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 34, § 7.16[B][1][a][i])). 
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described in the previous section,209 pre-infringement registration or the 
“Special Handling” option will minimize any period of “legal limbo.”210  
Given these options, a copyright holder should be able to sue 
immediately or, upon receiving notice of infringement and exercising 
the “Special Handling” registration option, after only a short time. 
The Ninth Circuit also thought that the requirement of waiting for 
approval or rejection of a copyright registration was a “needless 
formality”211 that led to an “‘inefficient and peculiar result.’”212  A court 
that adopts the Registration Approach, however, will ultimately save 
judicial resources as it will have to entertain fewer motions, 
amendments, and arguments.213  A clear adoption of the Registration 
Approach will result in litigants whose copyright registrations have been 
either affirmatively approved or rejected by the Copyright Office, 
resulting in a clear litigation strategy.  The Application Approach, on the 
other hand, may lead to several inefficiencies during the course of 
litigation. 
For example, assume that a jurisdiction follows the Application 
Approach and allows suit to be filed before a registration certificate has 
actually been issued.  Even if the registration is eventually approved, the 
plaintiff will not have a registration certificate to use as prima facie 
evidence of a valid copyright,214 resulting in more arguments, more 
 209. See supra Part IV.D.2. 
 210. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 620 (citing NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 34, 
§ 7.16[B][1][a][i]). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. (quoting Brush Creek Media, Inc. v. Boujaklian, No. C-02-3491, 2002 WL 1906620, at 
*4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2002)).  The Cosmetic Ideas court found that it “makes little sense to dismiss a 
case (which will likely be refiled in a matter of weeks or months) simply because the Copyright Office 
has not made a prompt decision that will have no substantive impact on whether or not a litigant can 
ultimately proceed.”  Id. at 620. 
 213. Inefficiencies arise when the approach to copyright registration in a given court or 
jurisdiction is not known, especially in jurisdictions that adopt the Registration Approach.  For example, 
in M.G.B Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486 (11th Cir. 1990), a copyright holder 
brought suit after applying for a copyright registration but before receiving it.  Id.  The trial court, 
applying the Registration Approach, dismissed the case for failure to satisfy the registration 
precondition.  Id. at 1489.  M.G.B. then filed an amended copyright registration application with the 
Copyright Office, and upon being issued a certificate of registration, M.G.B filed a motion to amend its 
original complaint, which the court granted over jurisdictional objections of the defendant.  Id.  The 
circuit court noted that the more appropriate course of action would have been for the plaintiff to file a 
new complaint once it received the certificate, it found that allowing the case to proceed was within the 
spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and supported by case law.  Id. at 1488–89.  Had the 
jurisdiction clearly adopted the Registration Approach, M.G.B. would have waited to file suit until the 
registration certificate had been received, avoiding the unnecessary motions, amendments, and 
confusion. 
 214. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (2006) (“In any judicial proceedings the certificate of a registration made 
before or within five years after first publication of the work shall constitute prima facie evidence of the 
validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate.  The evidentiary weight to be accorded 
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motions, and more time of the court’s consumed.215  Furthermore, if the 
Copyright Office issues the certificate after litigation is begun, the 
plaintiff will likely amend the complaint to reflect this fact, which, 
depending on the stage of the proceeding, may change the evidentiary 
burdens of the parties.216 
On the other hand, suppose that in the same Application Approach 
jurisdiction the Copyright Office rejects an application for copyright 
registration after litigation has already begun.  The plaintiff must then 
notify the Register of the intention to proceed with the infringement 
action, and the Register will then have the option of joining regarding 
the issue of registrability of the copyright claim.217  Therefore, the action 
has now added parties (potentially the Register), added issues (copyright 
validity in addition to the copyright infringement), and added time (the 
Register may appear within sixty days of service).218  Alternatively, 
upon learning that the registration was refused, the plaintiff may find the 
infringement battle to be too onerous and decide to drop suit altogether, 
resulting in a needlessly-filed-and-dropped lawsuit.  Either way, judicial 
resources are unnecessarily consumed. 
In effect, because various burdens and litigation strategies ultimately 
hang on the Register’s decision to approve or deny the registration, the 
Application Approach itself creates a period of “legal limbo”219 that 
affects not just the plaintiff but all parties, the Register, and the court.  
This “waste of judicial resources”220 can easily be avoided by the clear 
adoption of the Registration Approach.  When a plaintiff is forced under 
the Registration Approach to wait until a copyright is either approved or 
rejected by the Copyright Office, the course of litigation is more obvious 
and more efficient. 
the certificate of a registration made thereafter shall be within the discretion of the court.”). 
 215. The Ninth Circuit noted that the absence of prima facie evidence may actually be a boon to 
the defendant, as the plaintiff will bear a higher evidentiary burden of proving the validity of its 
copyright.  Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 621 n.14.  It did not note the extra time and resources consumed 
by this higher burden, however. 
 216. See La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1205 (10th Cir. 
2005) (“[T]he Application approach allows for shifting entitlements” that “would generate uncertainty in 
copyright litigation that the Act was designed to moderate.”), abrogated in part by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. 
Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010). 
 217. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (West 2010). 
 218. Id. 
 219. This period of “legal limbo” continues between the institution of a suit following the 
submission of an application to the Copyright Office and the affirmative action of the Register. 
 220. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 621. 
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4. Formalities and Accordance with the Berne Convention 
Section 411(a) imposes the formality of registration on copyright 
holders of U.S. works who wish to bring an infringement suit, regardless 
of whether a court adopts the Registration Approach or the Application 
Approach.  According to the Ninth Circuit, “[t]he registration 
approach’s added requirement of affirmative approval or rejection 
before suit thus amounts to little more than just the type of needless 
formality Congress generally worked to eliminate in the 1976 Act.”221  
Congress, however, did not “eliminate” formalities with the 1976 Act; it 
merely reduced them.222  Since the passage of the 1976 Act, it has 
reduced them even further to make the United States a party to the Berne 
Convention, and in doing so it has expressly considered and retained the 
registration requirements of § 411(a). 
In 1988, Congress amended § 411(a) of the Copyright Act and created 
a two-tier system in which registration is a precondition to infringement 
suits for United States works but not for foreign works.223  In seeking to 
reduce the formalities associated with registration and infringement 
actions, Congress expressly considered dispatching with the registration 
requirement altogether out of concern that “‘section 411(a) . . . is 
incompatible with Article 5(2) [of the] Berne [Convention].’”224  The 
House of Representatives rejected the Senate’s proposed modification 
that the registration precondition be eliminated completely,225 and the 
ultimate amendment of § 411(a) retained the registration formality for 
U.S. works but not for foreign works.226  In 1993, Congress again 
considered a proposal that eliminated the registration requirement; the 
proposal did not pass.227 
As Congress has considered and rejected several proposals that would 
eliminate the formality of copyright registration altogether, Congress 
clearly intends for some level of formality to remain intact.  Both the 
 221. Id. at 620. 
 222. For example, registration is a precondition to an infringement suit, and a deposit must be 
made with the Library of Congress in order to effect such registration. 
 223. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (noting that copyright registration is a precondition for a “civil action 
for infringement of the copyright in any United States work”) (emphasis added). 
 224. La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1205 (10th Cir. 
2005) (quoting S. REP. NO. 100-352, 14, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.A.A.N. 3706, 3719), abrogated in part 
by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010). 
 225. Id. at 1205 (“‘The House passed bill left current law intact, finding that current recordation 
and registration are not formalities prohibited by Berne.’” (quoting 134 CONG. REC. 10091, 10095 
(1988))). 
 226. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a). 
 227. La Resolana Architects, 416 F.3d at 1206 (citing Copyright Reform Act of 1993, H.R. 897, 
103d Congress (1993) (rewriting §§ 410 and 411 to eliminate the registration precondition). 
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Application and Registration Approaches require the formalities of an 
application, a deposit, and a fee before the institution of an infringement 
action.  While the Registration Approach adds the additional formality 
of the Register’s approval, nothing indicates that Congress finds the first 
three formalities acceptable but rejects the fourth.  Congress has had 
multiple opportunities to amend the statute with the express intention of 
reducing formalities, but has instead chosen to leave the substantive 
language of § 411(a) intact. 
The Registration Approach is consistent with the intention of the 1976 
Act, its subsequent amendments, and the Berne Convention.  The two-
tiered system for U.S. and foreign works may be a bit unwieldy and 
arguably undesirable, but it is what Congress has created.  If Congress 
found affirmative action by the Copyright Register prior to the 
institution of an infringement suit to be a “needless formality,”228 
Congress could have eliminated it by amending the statute; however, it 
has not.  Instead, Congress has decided that in order for a U.S. copyright 
holder to gain the incentivized benefits of copyright registrations, the 
holder must also suffer some formalities, one of which is—or at least 
should be—the Register’s approval or rejection of a registration 
application. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Cosmetic Ideas v. IAC/Interactivecorp, the Ninth Circuit erred in 
adopting the Application Approach to copyright registration within the 
meaning of § 411(a) of the Copyright Act.229  In doing so, the court 
disregarded Congress’s language and intent and substituted its own 
judgment for what American copyright law should be. 
The Registration Approach, which requires affirmative action by the 
Register of Copyrights before an infringement action may be instituted, 
is better supported by the plain language of the statute and its legislative 
history.  Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on persuasive 
authority was suspect.  Finally, the Registration Approach supports 
policy goals such as a robust federal register, fairness, judicial 
efficiency, and accordance with international treaties as well as or better 
than the Application Approach. 
Nimmer wrote, “In some sense, the dispute between the registration 
and application approaches is a tempest in a teapot.”230  In practice, a 
 228. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F.3d 612, 620 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
IAC/InterActiveCorp, v. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 686 (2010). 
 229. Id. 
 230. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 34, § 7.16[B][3][b][v]. 
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jurisdiction’s approach may have little effect on the overall impact on 
the outcome of an infringement suit.  A suit filed prematurely (that is, 
before a registration certificate has been issued) in a jurisdiction that 
follows the Registration Approach will likely be merely dismissed; the 
copyright holder can probably refile in a matter of weeks or months.  
The Copyright Office’s Special Handling procedure can expedite 
registrations that are filed near the end of the statute of limitations.  Due 
process, however, mandates that citizens have notice of the laws that 
govern them.  While no one has apparently argued that § 411(a) is 
unconstitutionally vague, the statute has eluded a consistent 
interpretation. 
Clarity can come in one of two ways.  First, the U.S. Supreme Court 
could grant certiorari to an appeal regarding the proper interpretation of 
§ 411(a).  The Court, however, seems to have little interest in doing so; 
it recently denied certiorari to IAC/Interactivecorp’s petition despite the 
widening circuit split.231 
Second, Congress could amend the Copyright Act to give clarity to 
the meaning of “registration.”  For example, it might change the text of 
§ 101 to indicate that “registration” requires the Register’s affirmative 
approval.232  Congress could also amend the text of § 411(a) to show 
(even more clearly than it already does) that registration as a 
precondition to an infringement suit requires more than the Copyright 
Office’s mere receipt of the applicable materials.233 
Whatever the source of the change, the Registration Approach is 
better supported by the history and current language of § 411(a).  It also 
better serves the overall policy goals of the Copyright Act of 1976, 
which was adopted to bring consistency to copyright actions, rights, and 
remedies nationwide.  With the text, history, and policy goals in mind, 
the Supreme Court or Congress should adopt the Registration Approach 
and give guidance to copyright holders and courts contemplating 
copyright infringement actions. 
 231. IAC/Interactivecorp v. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 686 (2010). 
 232. It might read that registration “means a registration of the claim affirmatively granted by the 
Register of Copyrights in the original or the renewed and extended term of the copyright” (emphasized 
text added to original text of 17 U.S.C. § 101). 
 233. Part of 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) could be amended to read “no civil action for infringement of the 
copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until an application for preregistration or 
registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title and has been approved by 
the Register of Copyrights” (emphasized text added to original text of § 411(a)).  Alternatively, to 
parallel the structure of the next sentence of § 411(a), it might read, “where the deposit, application and 
fee required for preregistration or registration of a United States work have been delivered to the 
Copyright Office in proper form and registration has been approved, the applicant is entitled to institute 
a civil action for infringement.” 
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